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801 
CRIMINALIZING YAKUZA MEMBERSHIP: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE  
ANTI-BORYOKUDAN LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE YAKUZA’S PLACE IN MODERN JAPANESE SOCIETY 
Originating in Japan and operating across the globe, the Yakuza are 
regarded as some of the most sophisticated and wealthiest criminal 
organizations.
1
 Yakuza gangs operate a wide variety of illegal revenue-
generating activities ranging from securities fraud to traditional extortion 
of civilians.
2
 These hierarchical criminal organizations are classified under 
Japanese Law as boryokudan (violence groups).
3
 As of 2010, the National 
Police Agency identified 22 boryokudan groups operating in Japan.
4
  
In July 2011, the United States Department of State included the 
Yakuza on a list of four transnational criminal organizations that “facilitate 
and aggravate violent civil conflicts.”5 Pursuant to this order, in 2012, the 
Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets of two members of the largest 
Yakuza syndicate, the Yamaguchi-gumi.
6
 Despite these foreign 
designations, Japanese law does not criminalize active Yakuza 
membership.
7
 While a direct prohibition on Yakuza membership would 
appear to be the most efficient method of eliminating the Yakuza, the 
Japanese legislature, the Diet, has refrained from enacting such 
legislation.
8
 The Diet has instead opted for piecemeal legislation aimed at 
impeding Yakuza revenue-raising activities, increasing liability for 
criminal acts by Yakuza members, and empowering local citizens who 
 
 
 1. Lt. Bruce A. Gragert, Yakuza: The Warlords of Japanese Organized Crime, 4 ANN. SURV. OF 
INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 148 (1997).  
 2. See generally id.; DAVID KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: JAPAN’S CRIMINAL 
UNDERWORLD 163 (2012).  
 3. See 暴力団員による不当な行為の防止等に関する法律 (Botaiho) [Law Concerning Prevention 
of Unjust Acts by Organized Crime Groups], Law No. 115 of 2006 and Law No. 53 of 2012, available 
at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H03/H03HO077.html.  
 4. Nat’l Police Academy, Crime in Japan in 2010, 15 (2011) [hereinafter Crime in Japan in 
2010].  
 5. Exec. Order No. 13,581, 3 C.F.R. 13581 (2011).  
 6. Press Release, U.S. Dept. Treas., Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Key Members of the 
Yakuza And Brothers’ Circle Criminal Organizations (Feb. 23, 2012) (available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1430.aspx).  
 7. “Japan has no law which penalizes the unification of criminal organization[s].” Ko Shikata, 
Yakuza—Organized Crime in Japan, 9 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 416, 419 (2006). 
 8. Id. 
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choose to challenge Yakuza groups.
9
 Eighteen years after the Japanese 
legislature enacted its first regulations aimed at curbing Yakuza activities, 
the National Police Agency proudly proclaimed in 2010 that Yakuza 
membership nationwide had dropped back to 1992-levels.
10
  
Part II of this Note will describe Yakuza’s role in Japan. Part III will 
examine the Anti-Boryokudan law, its revisions, and implementation 
against the Yakuza. Part III will also describe the Yakuza’s reactions and 
adaptations to the law.  
Part IV will take a comparative look at the laws criminalizing 
organized crime membership in the United States and Italy. This 
examination includes an analysis of the relevant laws’ language, 
legislative history, and evolution following implementation.  
This Note will conclude with the following observations: The Anti-
Boryokudan Law’s primary effect has been to organize public opinion 
against the Yakuza. However, the legislation relies too heavily on 
individuals and communities to shoulder the burden in the battle against 
the Yakuza. Until legislation is enacted that provides prosecutors with the 
tools necessary to attach criminal liability to Yakuza membership, the 
Yakuza will remain an influential presence in Japanese society.  
II. THE YAKUZA AND JAPAN 
Part of the debate about the Yakuza’s role in Japanese society is 
encapsulated in the group’s historical origins.11 The modern Yakuza trace 
their lineage back to the machi-yakko, 17th century Robin Hood-type civil 
defense groups, who protected townspeople from gangs of rogue 
samurai.
12
 However, the link to the heroic machi-yakko is merely a Yakuza 
 
 
 9. See generally Andrew Rankin, 21st-Century Yakuza: Recent Trends in Organized Crime in 
Japan, Yakuza Part 1, ASIA PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/-
Andrew-Rankin/3688 [hereinafter Rankin Part 1].  
 10. Jake Adelstein, Yakuza Members in Japan Lowest Since 1992 Anti-Organized Laws Went in 
to Effect; National Police Agency Announces 2010 Figures (Apr. 16. 2011), http://www.japan 
subculture.com/Yakuza-members-in-japan-lowest-since-1992-anti-organized-laws-went-in-to-effect-
national-police-agency-announces-2010-figures/.  
 11. See generally Eliza Fisher, From Outcasts to Overlords: The Legitimation of the Yakuza in 
Japanese Society, 3 UNDERGRADUATE J. OF SOC. STUD. 1, 4. (2012). 
 12. During the Tokugawa Shogunate’s reign, Samurai were left unemployed. KAPLAN & DUBRO, 
supra note 2, at 14–18. Many of these unemployed Samurai, known as “ronin,” formed outlaw gangs 
called the hatamoto-yakko (servants of the town) that raided towns and terrorized citizens. Id. The 
machi-yakko were townspeople and other former ronin who formed groups to protect themselves from 
the hatamoto-yakko. Id. While the YakuzaYakuza identify themselves with the machi-yakko, a direct 
historical connection is hard to make. Id. Furthermore, while the machi-yakko are generally portrayed 
as protectors of the town, that description fails to take into account the fact that the machi-yakko were 
also involved in various criminal activities. Id.  
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brand narrative designed to posture the Yakuza as an essential and 
benevolent force in traditional Japanese society.
13
 In fact, the Yakuza did 
not emerge until the 18th century and can be traced to two groups, tekiya 
and bakuto, marketplace managers and professional gamblers.
14
 
Regardless of its veracity, the National Police Agency has recognized that 
the Yakuza’s association with concepts of traditional Japanese chivalry 
and nobility are an effective tactic in obtaining a degree of social tolerance 
for the Yakuza.
15
  
Times of crisis have provided the Yakuza with high profile 
opportunities to promote their image as protector of the people.
16
 Yakuza 
groups delivered aid to the victims of the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 
1995 and again following the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in 
2011.
17
 News stories in 1995 frequently emphasized—possibly at the 
Yakuza’s urging—the Yakuza’s ability to deliver aid (sometimes more 
quickly and efficiently than the national government).
18
 Other reports 
portrayed the Yakuza operating as de facto police, patrolling the streets in 
 
 
 13. Id. Interestingly, Yakuza rituals, political views, and showy appearance compare most 
closely with the hamamoto-yakko rather than the machi-yakko. Peter B.E. Hill, The Japanese Mafia: 
Yakuza, LAW & ST. 38 (2008).  
 14. Tekiya (street peddlers) established control over portable booths in market fairs held at 
temples and shrines. Gragert, Yakuza supra note 1, at 150–53. They were organized according to 
feudal status and would extort protection money from merchants in order to control the allocation of 
stalls as well as the availability of the goods to be sold. Id. Tekiya operations were mostly legal and 
received official recognition from feudal lords. Id. The shogunate granted the tekiya status that was 
roughly equivalent to that of the Samurai in order to reduce fraud and the possibility of turf wars 
among the gangs. Id. Bakuto (traditional gamblers) engaged in illegal gambling but were actually 
recruited by Tokugawa government officials. Id. at 153–54. The officials hired the bakuto to gamble 
with workers engaged in large government irrigation and construction projects as a scheme to earn 
back the salary paid to the workers. Id. Later, bakuto organized into disciplined groups and began 
operating throughout Japan. Id. The bakuto gave the Yakuza a number of its most famous traditions: 
finger cutting, tattooing, and strict adherence to secrecy, as well as their name. Id. Yakuza is a slang 
term for the worst possible hand in the traditional card game hana fuda: 8(ya), 9(ku), 3(za). Id. Bakuto 
were also given some measure of official sanction from the feudal lords. Id. See also KAPLAN & 
DUBRO, supra note 2, at 18–27. The bakuto also had a penchant for violence that led the Tokugawa 
shogunate to request their help in policing the realm and recruiting gang members to fight in the civil 
war surrounding the Meiji Restoration. EIKO MARUKO SINIAWER, RUFFIANS, YAKUZA, NATIONALIST: 
THE VIOLENT POLITICS OF MODERN JAPAN, 1860–1960, 25 (2008).  
 15. “It cannot be denied, however, that due to confusion noble sounding words such as ninkyo 
(Yakuza notion of chivalry) and jingi (Yakuza justice) there is a pernicious tendency in our society to 
tolerate the existence of these gangs, or to regard them as exciting and exotic.” Andrew Rankin, Recent 
Trends in Organized Crime in Japan: Yakuza vs. the Police, & Foreign Crime Gangs, Part 2, ASIA 
PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrew-Rankin/3692 [hereinafter 
Rankin Part 2] (citing Nat’l Police Agency, Heisei 19-nen kamihanki Boryokudan josei) (The State of 
Organized Crime in the First Two Quarters of 2007).  
 16. See Rankin Part 2, supra note 15. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jake Adelstein, Yakuza to the Rescue, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.the 
dailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/18/japanese-yakuza-aid-earthquake-relief-efforts.html.  
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gangs to enforce order.
19
 Yakuza groups arrived with trucks of food and 
necessities before other organizations were able to mobilize their relief 
efforts.
20
 By contrast, Yakuza bosses appeared reluctant to publicize their 
relief efforts in 2011.
21
 Their apparent modesty may be attributable to the 
backlash that occurred in 1995 following reports that Yakuza members 
had demanded letters of support from citizens in exchange for aid.
22
  
The Yakuza also portray themselves as ultra-Japanese through 
associations with right-wing political groups.
23
 The Yakuza have been 
connected with Japan’s ultranationalist movement from the movement’s 
inception.
24
 The relationship has provided the Yakuza with political 
influence and has contributed to the portrayal of the Yakuza as protectors 
of Japanese traditions, untainted by Westernization.
25
 In the early 
twentieth century, several Yakuza bosses served as Diet members, 
reinforcing the involvement of Yakuza groups in politics.
26
 Yoshida 
Isokichi, a prominent boss from Kyushu, was held as an ideal 
parliamentarian in the 1900s and a mythically brave “man of chivalry.”27  
 
 
 19. The Yamaguchi-gumi, the Sumiyoshi-kai, and the Inagawa-kai were reported to have 
“compiled squads to patrol the streets of their turf and keep an eye out to make sure looting and 
robbery doesn’t occur.” Christopher Beam, Stop Thief! Thank You, SLATE (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2011/03/stop_thief_thank_you.html.  
 20. Adelstein, supra note 18.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Since the Yakuza’s violent participation in combating the student strikes of 1960 and 
Japanese leftist movements culminating with the assassination of Inejiro Asanuma, head of the Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP), the Yakuza have shifted away from engaging in physical violence on behalf of 
the right-wing. SINIAWER, supra note 14, at 168–73. Instead the Yakuza have used economic tools, 
principally corruption, as their method of wielding influence. Id. at 173. The downfall of several 
prominent politicians since the 1990s, including Prime Ministers Noburo and Yoshiro, due to Yakuza 
connections highlights the need for the Yakuza to act covertly in their political machinations. Id.  
 24. Id. at 168–73.  
 25. In the mid-1800’s Mitsuru Toyama founded the ultranationalist Dark Ocean Society which 
waged a “campaign of terror, blackmail and assassination to exert influence over military officials and 
government officials” in the rapidly-modernizing Japan. KAPLAN & DUBRO, supra note 2, at 33–34. In 
1892, during Japan’s first ever national elections, the Dark Ocean Society joined with over 300 
Yakuza members and police officers to harass anti-government opponents and promote the election of 
conservative politicians. Id. The Dark Ocean Society was responsible for the assassination of the 
Queen of Korea and it was the members of this movement that later led Japan into World War II. Id. 
The Yakuza and the ultranationalist were easily allied because of shared ideologies: both resented 
foreigners and foreign ideals; were threatened by liberal and socialist movements; revered a 
romanticized past that deified the emperor; and organized themselves in similar oyabun-kobun 
(adopted parent-son) structures. Id.  
 26. SINIAWER, supra note 14, at 93.  
 27. “In Diet sessions, Yoshida was ‘misleadingly’ described as sitting like a golden Buddha in 
dignified silence.” Id. at 92. One explanation for the acceptance of Yakuza bosses as Diet members 
was that during the 1920s elected representatives often turned to violence when speech was sufficient, 
and brawling was standard practice on the Diet floor. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/9
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Incidents in 2013 have revealed that connections remain between the 
Yakuza and right-wing political groups in their attempts to exert influence 
in Japan’s current political climate.28 Territorial conflicts between Japan 
and its Asian neighbors have rekindled nationalist sentiment in Japan.
29
 
The combination of an ideological shift further towards the right and the 
severing of ties to Japan’s geographic neighbors may provide an 
opportunity for the Yakuza to exert power and influence. However, there 
still remains a dispute among commentators as to whether the Japanese 
public accepts the perception of the Yakuza as ultra-Japanese or simply a 
group of criminals.
30
 
There is great public interest in Yakuza exploits, as well as respect for 
their achievements, both domestically and abroad.
31
 Weekly and daily 
Yakuza fan magazines, the “de facto trade publications” of organized 
crime in Japan, are available at newsstands, convenience stores, and public 
libraries.
32
 Yakuza techniques and etiquette are also popular themes for 
self-help and management books aimed at businessmen.
33
 Films, 
documentaries, and video games portraying the Yakuza as code-adhering 
gentlemen capable of ninja-like assassinations have also become a staple 
Japanese cultural export.
34
  
The Yakuza’s aggressive public relations efforts have not kept the issue 
of their utility in modern Japanese society from becoming the focus of 
 
 
 28. Japan’s Ultranationalists: Old Habits Die Hard, THE ECONOMIST (May 17, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/9205495/print; Jake Adelstein, The Yakuza Lobby, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/13/the_yakuza_lobby; Anna Watanabe, 
Japan: Severed Finger Sent to Politician by Right Wing Group, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT (Mar. 13, 
2012), http://asiancorrespondent.com/78045/japan-severed-finger-sent-to-politician-by-right-wing-
group/.  
 29. See generally Could Asia Really go to War Over These?, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 22, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21563316. See also Fight Over Rocky Islets Opens Old Wounds 
Between South Korea and Japan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
10/05/world/asia/south-korea-and-japan-fight-over-rocky-islets.html.  
 30. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Prominent titles include Jitsuwa Jidai, Jitsuwa Jiho, Jitsuwa Document, and Asahi Geino. 
Jake Adelstein, The Strange World of Yakuza Fan Magazines, PUBLISHING PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 30 
2009), http://publishingperspectives.com/2009/10/the-strange-world-of-Yakuza-fan-magazines/. Each 
magazine is closely affiliated with a specific Yakuza group. Id. The Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest 
syndicate, does not fully cooperate with the magazines. Id. Despite having a no-interview policy since 
2005 they are often covered by Jistuwa Document. Id.  
 33. Titles include “Management Skills of the Yamaguchi-gumi (2005), Yakuza Techniques for 
Overcoming Business Hurdles through Successful Speaking and Listening (2006), Modern Yakuza 
Tips for Making Cash (2008), the ominous-sounding Yakuza Techniques for Dealing with Complaints 
(2010), and, for romantic hopefuls, Choosing your Man: Yakuza Tips for Telling a Winner from a 
Loser (2008).” Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 34. Rankin cites both the French documentary “Young Yakuza” (2007) as well as a 2009 CBS 
Report on the Yakuza. Id. See also OUTRAGE (Magnolia Pictures 2009).  
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public debate. Periods of intense violence during turf wars between gangs, 
widely reported acts of Yakuza vigilante justice, and the Yakuza’s 
increasing connections to foreigners have fostered a resilient and vocal 
anti-Yakuza movement.
35
 Even so, public sentiment has not entirely 
shifted, and some still argue that Japanese society is better off with the 
Yakuza than without them.
36
 Supporters of the “necessary evil” argument 
contend that the Yakuza are a stabilizing force in what would otherwise be 
a chaotic criminal underworld.
37
 Others, including Japanese talk show host 
Ogura Tomoaki, contend that there are problems uniquely suited to the 
dispute resolution techniques of the Yakuza.
38
 In litigation-averse Japan, 
many Japanese voluntarily take their problems to the Yakuza rather than 
resolving them through judicial channels.
39
 Ogura was censured for his 
comments, but his sentiment probably represents a “small but solid 
minority of Japanese who accept the role of the Yakuza as unofficial 
enforcers in Japanese society.”40 Ogura’s contention may say more about 
the Japanese civil court systems than the Yakuza. The Yakuza continue to 
play a role in resolving minor disputes between non-Yakuza members 
even after the enactment of laws designed to curb Yakuza mediation.
41
 
Support for the main legislation aimed at the Yakuza, the Anti-
Boryokudan Law, came from three sources: international pressure, 
domestic politics, and the Yakuza themselves. Japanese politicians were 
under pressure from their U.S. counterparts for not pulling their weight in 
the “War on Drugs.”42 Relations between the two nations were already 
strained due to a bilateral trade imbalance.
43
 Japanese politicians felt 
compelled to act after being criticized for being slow to comply with the 
 
 
 35. See Fukuoka Starts New Anti-Gang Campaign, THE TOKYO REPORTER (Aug. 5, 2012), 
http://www.tokyoreporter.com/2012/08/05/fukuoka-starts-new-anti-gang-campaign/ (Describing how 
business leaders and law enforcement are mobilizing against gang activity).  
 36. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Ogura may be referring to problems within the entertainment industry, where the Yakuza are 
known to retain substantial influence, or civil disputes, such as car accidents, where, in litigation-
adverse Japan, the Yakuza have become mediators. Id.  
 39. Id. In a practice called mimbo, one party will hire a Yakuza member who will visit the other 
party and “suggest” a settlement amount. Gragert, supra note 1, at 184–85. The other person generally 
pays regardless of his actual liability. Id.  
 40. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 41. JEFF KINGSTON, CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE SINCE 
THE 1980S 252 (2012).  
 42. Peter Hill, Heisei Yakuza: Burst Bubble and Bôtaihô, 6 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 1, 14 (2003).  
 43. RICHARD H. FRIMAN, NARCODIPLOMACY: EXPORTING THE U.S. WAR ON DRUGS 64, 78–79 
(1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/9
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1988 UN anti-drug trafficking convention.
44
 Unlike the U.S. and European 
parties to the convention, “Japan lacked specific countermeasures against 
organized crime.”45 In the mid-1980s, several high profile gang wars broke 
out across Japan.
46
 These conflicts created a poor public image of the 
Yakuza.
47
 Public tolerance of the Yakuza also waned as Yakuza 
participation in the legitimate economy increased during Japan’s real 
estate bubble.
48
 The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had been 
looking for an opportunity to clean up its image following a string of 
scandals, disgraced prime ministers, and electoral disasters.
49
 Prime 
Minister Kaifu Toshiki took a hard line against the Yakuza and introduced 
the Anti-Boryokudan law in hopes of regaining public confidence.
50
 The 
Anti-Boryokudan was thus introduced as a result of the confluence of 
domestic and international factors.  
III. THE ANTI-BORYOKUDAN LAW  
A. Boryokudan Designation 
The Anti-Boryokudan Law, enacted in 1991, was the first of Japan’s 
three major laws against organized crime.
51
 The Anti-Boryokudan law is 
an executive law that prescribes regulations for the Yakuza.
52
 The law has 
undergone a number of revisions since 1991, most notably in 2006 and 
 
 
 44. Japanese policymakers at the time viewed cooperation on drug issues as a means to defuse 
broader bilateral relations. Id.  
 45. Hill, supra note 42, at 14. 
 46. These gang wars included: [A] conflict between the Yamaguchi-gumi and a breakaway 
faction, the Ichiwa-kai which resulted in 25 deaths and over 500 arrests; a war just outside of Tokyo 
between the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Tokyo-based Nibiki-kai; and an internal war between the 
Kokuryo-kai on Okinawa that resulted in the death of a high school student mistaken for a Yakuza 
member. Id. at 13.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Hill explains, 
The economic conditions of the bubble allowed the Yakuza to borrow money from cash-flush 
banks. The Yakuza would then use this money in real-estate and stock market speculation. 
During these transactions, the Yakuza would use their organizational leverage to obtain more 
favorable terms; when the real estate or stock underperformed, the Yakuza would demand 
compensation from the sellers. 
HILL, supra note 13, at 139. 
 49. Hill, supra note 42, at 13–14. 
 50. Id. at 14.  
 51. Shikata, supra note 7, at 419. The Anti-Boryokudan Law is alternatively referred to as the 
“Organized Crime Counter Measures Law.” MIAYAZAKI MANUBU, TOPPAMONO 403 (2005). The 
Anti-Boryokudan Law passed unanimously with no criticism. Hill, supra note 13, at 158.  
 52. Shikata, supra note 7, at 419. 
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2012.
53
 The original legislation allowed the Prefectural Public Safety 
Commissions to designate certain groups as “boryokudan” (violence 
groups).
54
 Article 3 of the Act stipulates that in order for the Prefectural 
Public Safety Commission to designate a group as boryokudan: 
(1) regardless of the group’s purpose, it must allow members to take 
advantage of the gang’s influence in order to maintain their daily lives, 
accumulate wealth, or execute their business; (2) a certain percentage of 
the gang members must have criminal records; and (3) the gang must be 
hierarchically organized under the control of an individual representing the 
gang.
55
  
The Anti-Boryokudan Law does not provide a specific formula or 
process for weighing the factors in determining the gang’s “real 
purpose.”56 Similarly, the act doesn’t articulate the specific hierarchical 
structure or minimum membership thresholds required to fulfill the third 
factor.
57
 Legislators do, however, offer a degree of clarity when 
articulating the exact crimes that satisfy the act’s criminal record 
provisions.
58
 This clarity is confined to this specific portion of the second 
factor, as the subsequent text provides a multitude of formulas prefectural 
centers can utilize when calculating the group’s criminal membership 
percentage to determine if the group exceeds the legal threshold.
59
 The 
threshold itself is determined by further ordinances and is not established 
in the Anti-Boryokudan Law.
60
  
Even if all three criteria are met, the Public Safety Commission must 
hold a hearing on the matter in which group members can make statements 
on the group’s behalf.61 The Public Safety Commission must also consider 
 
 
 53. Supra note 3. 
 54. Id. art. 3, para. 2  
 55. Id. art 3. § 1-3.  
 56. Id. art 3. § 1.  
 57. Id. art. 3 § 3.  
 58. Art. 3 Sections 2(a)-(f) list a number of criminal offenses that satisfy the criminal record 
requirement. Id. art 3 § 2. While the list is specific, its application covers nearly every offense under 
Japan’s Criminal Code. Id. The Act allows the Prefectural Public Safety Commission to calculate the 
criminal membership by comparing the percentage of criminal record holders to the leading members 
of the gang, or the percentage in the number of holders of criminal records as compared with the total 
number of members. Id. art 3 § 2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The threshold percentage will then be compared to see if it “exceeds a percentage prescribed 
by a relevant government ordinance.” Id. art. 2 § 2(a)-(f).  
 61. According to Botaiho, 
These hearings are to be held publicly but may be private in order to provide privacy when 
required. The gang must be given advance notice of the hearing and a representative of the 
gang is able to make statements on the gang’s behalf during the hearing. Should a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/9
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the opinions of a panel of witnesses, usually lawyers, before making a 
designation.
62
 Designations are published and remain in effect for three 
years unless the boryokudan dissolves or fundamentally changes in a 
manner such that it no longer falls within the boryokudan criteria.
63
  
B. The Initial Yakuza Reaction and Implementation of the Law 
The Yakuza’s initial reaction to the implementation of the Anti-
Boryokudan Law was to adapt internally while engaging in an aggressive 
public relations campaign against the law. The external actions came to a 
peak on the date of the Anti-Boryokudan Law’s enactment; around 130 
Yakuza members protested in Ginza, claiming that the new law would 
lead to human rights abuses by the police.
64
 Internally, the metamorphosis 
required subtle changes in conduct and visibility. After the enactment of 
the Anti-Boryokudan Law, it was reported that Yakuza syndicates held a 
meeting where they distributed a manual entitled How to Evade the New 
Law.
65
 In general, Yakuza groups reorganized. Additionally, they replaced 
the signs on their headquarters and restructured their organizations in an 
effort to appear more like legitimate organizations.
66
  
The Yamaguchi-gumi, Aizu-Kotestsu, and Kusano-ikka eventually 
brought a lawsuit against the government challenging the constitutionality 
of the Anti-Boryokudan law.
67
 The Yamaguchi-gumi pulled out of the 
lawsuit after the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995 greatly affected its 
 
 
representative for the gang not appear, the Commission may designate the gang as a 
boryokudan after thirty days.  
Id. art. 5.  
 62. Id. art. 6.  
 63. Id. art. 7-8. Yakuza gangs’ responses varied from east to west. Hill, supra note 13, at 201–02. 
During the designation hearings, Tokyo Yakuza groups protested their designation but ultimately 
accepted it. Id. Tanake Keizo, who represented the Inagawa-kai, stated at the hearing, “whatever they 
might be, the laws decided on by the state are humbly and solemnly accepted.” Id. By contrast, the 
Yamaguchi-gumi protested on grounds similar to their eastern counterparts but did not accept their 
designation. Id. They, along with other groups from western Japan, filed lawsuits challenging the new 
law. Id.  
 64. Christopher J. Chipello & Yumiko Ono, Japanese Police Given New Law In Fight Against 
Organized Crime, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1992.  
 65. “The manual advises gangs to stop behaving like violent outfits and to pose as legitimate 
businesses, religious organizations, or political organizations.” Gragert, supra note 1, at 199.  
 66. The Yamaguchi-gumi ordered local bosses of affiliated gangs to register as companies, 
become chairmen of those companies, and appoint their lieutenants as directors. Id. at 199–200. Some 
reorganization techniques were less drastic than others; for example, the Inagawa-kai replaced the 
plaque outside their Roppongi headquarters simply to read “Inagawa Industries.” Chipello & Ono, 
supra note 64.  
 67. Manubu, supra note 51, at 425. 
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operations.
68
 On September 29, 1995, the Kyoto District Court issued an 
opinion dismissing the Aizu-kotestsu’s challenge.69 The opinion conceded 
that the law would eventually lead to restrictions on the gangster’s lives, 
but concluded that the purpose of the law was to allow the issuance of 
administrative orders preventing gangster organizations from engaging in 
unjust activities.
70
 The court reasoned that Article 14 of the Japanese 
Constitution, which guarantees all citizens equality under the law,
71
 did 
not guarantee absolute equality for citizens, and that selective application 
was rational in light of the nature of the activities the Anti-Boryokudan 
Law was intended to prevent.
72
  
Significantly, the Anti-Boryokudan Law neither criminalized Yakuza 
membership, nor did it deal with the companies directly or indirectly 
owned by the Yakuza.
73
 The law’s effect on the day-to-day business of the 
Yakuza was minimal. The Anti-Boryokudan Law did expand police 
investigative powers over the Yakuza, allowing Prefectural Police to 
require Boryokudan groups within the Prefecture to submit reports in 
addition to subjecting those groups to on-the-spot police inspections.
74
 
Articles 11 and 12 embody the only enforcement element of the law.
75
 
Under Articles 11 and 12, the police can issue cease-and-desist orders to 
Yakuza members who have been reported for attempting to engage in 
extortion.
76
 The original act limited the prefectural police to only issuing 
orders when a citizen reported that a Boryokudan member had attempted 
to extort money or had committed one of the other acts listed in Articles 
11 and 12.
77
 Punishment through the penal code is available once the 
Boryokudan member has violated the cease-and-desist order.
78
 The 
limitation to issuing cease-and-desist orders is the fundamental 
significance of the Anti-Boryokudan Law being administrative law. 
Behavior violating an administrative law is only subject to an injunction 
directing the perpetrator to stop; criminal law, which doles out 
 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 436. 
 70. Id.  
 71. JAPAN CONST. [KENPO], art. 14 available at http://web-japan.org/factsheet/en/pdf/09 
Constitution.pdf. 
 72. The Japanese Supreme Court confirmed the Kyoto District Court’s ruling in 1997. Id. at 426–
27.  
 73. Gragert, supra note 1, at 199.  
 74. Botaiho, Law No. 77 of 1991, art. 33 § 1-3.  
 75. Id. art. 11–12. 
 76. The duration of these orders are not to exceed one year. Id.; Chipello & Ono, supra note 64.  
 77. Botaiho, Law No. 77 of 1991, art. 11–12; Shikata, supra note 6, at 419. 
 78. Botaiho, Law No. 77 of 1991, art. 46–52.  
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punishment, only comes into effect when the perpetrator violates the 
injunction.
79
  
Miyazaki Manubu, an acclaimed journalist and the son of a top Yakuza 
boss, succinctly expressed the main criticisms of the original Anti-
Boryokudan Law. First, the ambiguous language of law made it difficult to 
interpret.
80
 Manubu contends that such legislation would not survive a 
U.S.-type “void for vagueness” challenge.81 Second, the law drew a clear 
distinction between citizens and Yakuza members.
82
 According to 
Manubu, one lawyer commented that the law harkened back to the 
wartime concept of hikokumin (unpatriotic citizen) and infringed on their 
human rights.
83
 However, human rights lawyers and the media were 
indifferent to what Manubu found to be human rights violations and 
rationalized such deprivations (“[yakuza] are bad, anyway[,]”)84 as 
constitutional for fear of public backlash.
85
 
The vagueness of Article 3, as well as the lack of any real punishments, 
could be attributed to the fear of some observers that the new law would 
push the Yakuza completely underground.
86
 Many felt that an 
underground Yakuza would be even harder to control.
87
 The openness of 
the original law, it was theorized, allowed police to keep better tabs on 
Yakuza activity.
88
 Just two years after the original implementation of the 
law, many officials feared that even the relatively light provisions of the 
Anti-Boryokudan law had accomplished this very task.
89
  
 
 
 79. Hill, supra note 13, at 166.  
 80. Manubu, supra note 51, at 405.  
 81. Id. Other commentators have also pointed out that the law rests feebly on the National Public 
Safety Commission’s (NPSC) subjective interpretations of the definitions of two key terms: “violent 
illegal activity” and “boryokudan”. Hill, supra note 13, at 170. A number of the NPSC’s illegal violent 
activities are not typical boryokudan activities, but rather measures that have traditionally been 
employed against left-wing groups. Id.  
 82. Manubu, supra note 51, at 405 (I need to double check page number from hard copy, I had a 
hard copy in Singapore but now am working off an electronic copy that does not have page numbers. 
 83.  Id. at 426. Manubu is specifically concerned that anti-boryokudan legislation criminalizes a 
person’s affiliations as opposed to their actions. Id. He remarks that such laws defy Western 
fundamentals of freedom and criminal law. Id. at 426–27.  
 84. Id. at 404–7.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Chipello & Ono, supra note 64.  
 87. Id. Manubu fears that tightening anti-Yakuza laws will only push the Yakuza to become 
more secretive, American-style criminal organizations. Manubu, supra note 51, at 423.  
 88. “Until now, gangsters have been allowed to flaunt their affiliations openly, posting thick-
lettered signboards outside their offices and sporting trademark lapel pins. The system sometimes 
seemed to foster a cozy relationship between gangsters and police. But it also enabled the authorities to 
keep close track of the groups, as the detailed membership statistics indicate.” Id.  
 89. “Many officials in Japan believe that the laws have also had an unwanted side effect, namely, 
driving the Yakuza underground and deeper into commercial business where they will continue to 
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While it may seem absurd to limit police action to situations where the 
individual being extorted reports the matter to police, providing citizens 
with the ability to exercise discretion could also be seen as a pragmatic 
solution. Japan lacks a comprehensive witness protection program, 
meaning a citizen threatened by the Yakuza might find paying the amount 
requested by the Yakuza more palatable than reporting the incident or 
testifying against a syndicate.
90
  
Skeptics and Yakuza members view the vagueness of the regulations as 
a strategic move on behalf of the police force.
91
 Unclear rules effectively 
require citizens and the Yakuza alike to rely on the police for clarity and 
final decisions.
92
 The police and the Yakuza also share a symbiotic 
relationship
93
 in the “protection market” or, as one Yakuza member noted, 
when the Yakuza move out “in comes the Sakuradaemon (referring to the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department’s symbol) gang.”94  
The Anti-Boryokudan Law also provides an avenue for corrupt 
members of the police force to impose a protection scheme on the Yakuza. 
Police members have been known to accept bribes from Yakuza members 
in exchange for overlooking shipments of illegal goods or providing alerts 
of impending police raids.
95
 Police members are also often beneficiaries of 
 
 
thrive and be even harder to detect.” Gragert, supra note 1, at 199.  
 90. Police will provide ad hoc protection, but there is no national program for relocating 
witnesses and their families. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 91. Id. 
 92. The National Police Agency (NPA) has set up online and telephone services for people 
seeking information about ordinance stipulations. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15. While the allegations 
seem thin based purely on this evidence, Rankin also notes that in 2011 the NPA announced the 
formation of “anti-Yakuza protection squads” that would be dispatched to guard individuals and 
businesses that each department’s director of protection determines are under threat of Yakuza 
violence. Id. The vagueness also allows the police to exercise a wide range of discretion in 
enforcement of the law. By controlling the law’s application, the police can “crack down on those who 
stand up to them and control those who follow with tails wagging.” MANUBU, supra note 51, at 412.  
 93. Rankin points to the pachinko industry as a good case study of the relationship between the 
Yakuza and the police. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15. The Yakuza infiltrated the pachinko industry in 
the 1970s. Id. The police eliminated the yYakuza presence in the 1980s. Id. The industry is now 
regulated by the Security Electronics and Communications Technology Association (SECTA). Id. 
SECTA is an immensely powerful organization; pachinko was a $230 billion dollar industry in 2012. 
Christine Kassover, Kinbasha Flexes Brand in Fragmented $230B Japanese Pachinko Industry, THE 
OTC INVESTOR (July 16, 2012), http://theotcinvestor.com/kinbasha-flexes-brand-in-fragmented-230b-
japanese-pachinko-industry-1499/. Rankin notes that investigative journalists estimate that one-third of 
SECTA’s employees are ex-policemen, indicating that when the police closed down the yYakuza 
rackets, they secured comfortable retirement positions for themselves regulating the pachinko industry. 
Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 94. Manubu also believes that one of the aims of the Anti-Boryokudan Law was to allow the 
police to replace the Yakuza as rulers of the adult-entertainment and pachinko industries. MANUBU, 
supra note 51, at 411. 
 95. Id.  
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free drinks at Yakuza-run bars and police have ignored some level of 
Yakuza violence in exchange for help from Yakuza in suppressing 
violence.
96
 A purely statistical snapshot does not indicate collaboration 
between the police and the Yakuza: the police arrested over a third of all 
Yakuza members in 2010.
97
 However, that number has not changed in 
over two decades,
98
 and the outlook is even worse when one considers the 
falling prosecution rate of those arrested.
99
  
C. The 2007 Revision to the Anti-Boryokudan Law 
In 2007, legislators attempted to strengthen the Anti-Boryokudan Law 
with revisions addressing Yakuza rituals and the hierarchal nature of 
Yakuza organizations.
100
 In Articles 16–26, the revised law introduced 
new restrictions aimed at the Yakuza’s recruitment efforts.101 Signature 
traditions such as ritual finger-cutting and coerced tattooing were 
prohibited.
102
 The revisions also included Article 28, which called upon 
the Prefectural Public Safety Commissions to provide support to 
 
 
 96. Gragert notes that police would leave the Yakuza alone provided they did not cross accepted 
boundaries; in exchange the Yakuza would act as an alternative police force by suppressing 
unorganized street crime. Gragert, supra note 1, at 201.  
 97. The official number of Yakuza arrests for 2010 is 25,681. Rankin Part 2, supra note 16. It 
should be noted that only 4 of those arrests were for violations of the Anti-Boryokudan law, down 
from 12 the previous year. Crime in Japan in 2010, supra note 4, at 71.  
 98. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 99. “[I]n 1991 prosecutors filed charges in 81% of cases; by 2010 that figure had dropped to 
68.2%.” Id.  
 100. Botaiho, Law No. 115 of 2006, art. 15-28. Botaiho had also previously been revised in 1993 
and in 1997. Kingston, supra note 41, at 240. In both cases the main purpose was to expand the scope 
of the law in response to the ways boryokudan had adapted their practices to avoid the provisions of 
the law. Hill, supra note 13, at 163.  
 101. Article 16 prohibits the coercing or inducing of minors or other individuals into affiliating 
with a Yakuza group. Botaiho, Law No. 115 of 2006, Art. 16-19. Article 16 also prohibits threats to an 
individual’s family made in attempt to recruit that person into the gang. Id. Article 17 then extends the 
prohibition to superior members, prohibiting them from ordering their subordinates to carry out these 
acts. Id. However, Articles 18 and 19 limit the measures police can implement to issue cease-and-
desist orders to Yakuza members accused of violating the Act. Id.  
 102. Ritual finger-cutting (yubitsume) is a traditional method of discipline within Yakuza groups; 
in 1992 it was estimated that nearly 42% of Yakuza members had had a finger amputated. Gragert, 
supra note 1, at 171. Tattoos have been the traditional marking of Yakuza members since Japan’s 
feudal period when authorities tattooed criminals with a black ring around the arm for each criminal 
offense. Id. Tattooing became a symbol of resistance and the process evolved into a test of strength 
embraced by Yakuza members. Id. Articles 20–23 prohibit the practice of coerced finger-cutting, as 
well of the ordering of a subordinate by a superior to engage in that behavior, but prescribes a 
punishment limited to issuing a cease-and-desist order. Botaiho, Law No. 115 of 2006, art. 20–23. 
Articles 24–26 also limit police action to issuing cease-and-desist orders, but the scope of the crime is 
larger as even introducing a minor to a tattoo artist is prohibited under the act. Botaiho, Law No. 115 
of 2006, art. 20–26. 
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individuals wanting to leave Yakuza groups.
103
 At the same time, the 
revision left the penal provisions unchanged and offered no new criminal 
enforcement measures for the police to utilize.
104
  
Despite the fact that the 2007 revision left the penal provisions 
unchanged and offered no new criminal enforcement measures, Article 15, 
Section 2 did introduce civil liability to the heads of the Yakuza gangs for 
damage caused by subordinate members using dangerous weapons.
105
 
Liability in civil compensation claims has had a dramatic impact on the 
structure and activities of the Yakuza.
106
 The damage liability provision 
had originally been implemented in a 2004 version of the act, but the 2007 
revision extended the provision to all damages incurred during turf wars or 
fundraising activities, including criminal acts, by underlings.
107
 Between 
2005 and 2008, the Yamaguchi-gumi underwent several major leadership 
changes; many theorize that this turmoil was a direct response to the 
expanding liability provisions.
108
 Following the 2007 revisions, the 
Yamaguchi-gumi faced lawsuits from business owners who had either 
been personally harmed or had their businesses physically destroyed by 
subordinates inflicting Yakuza justice.
109
 Japanese courts have interpreted 
 
 
 103. The section does not contain any specific provisions or guidelines for the national or local 
governments to follow. Id. art. 28. Instead, it largely defers to the prefectural centers with no specific 
requirements. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Representatives of the designated gang are liable for the intrusion of the life, physical body 
or property of a third party when a rivalry develops between the gangs. Id. art. 15 §§ 2–3. In addition, 
the liability of gang representatives is generally based on the provisions of Japan’s Civil Code. Id.  
 106. Rankin Part 1, supra note 9.  
 107. Id. See also Mob Crackdown Targets Bosses, Bidders, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 22, 2007), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/12/22/national/mob-crackdown-targets-bosses-bidders/#.UyO 
EX15dD3E.  
 108. Adelstein discusses Tadama Goto’s departure from a Yamaguchi-gumi sect and his desire to 
avoid liability for a murder carried out by his subordinates during his reign. Jake Adelstein, It’s Not 
Easy Being a Yakuza Boss, THE WIRE (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.thewire.com/global/2012/09/its-
not-easy-being-Yakuza-boss/57384/. The Yamaguchi-gumi’s head boss (oyabun) Yoshinori 
Wantanabe also resigned in 2005 amid mysterious circumstances. Eric Talmadge, Japan’s Mob 
Organizes for the Future, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 2, 2005) (available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20051002&id=v1MvAAAAIBAJ&sjid=OUUEA
AAAIBAJ&pg=6567,1991931). Many have attributed Wantanabe’s departure to the revised Anti-
Boryokudan law. Jake Adelstein, The Death and Legacy of Yakuza Boss ‘Mr. Gorilla’, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/03/the-death-and-legacy-of-
yakuza-boss-mr-gorilla.html.  
 109. The first landmark case involved a Thai bar owner who was running a gambling ring without 
paying the traditional dues to the Yamaguchi-gumi affiliate. Rankin Part 1, supra note 9. The gang 
assaulted staff members, stole cash from the register, and wrecked the bar. Id. The owner then sued the 
gang. Id. Despite the fact that Shinobu Tsukasa, the leader of the Yamaguchi-gumi was in jail at the 
time, and that the gang has over 40,000 members, the court ruled in favor of the bar owner and ordered 
Tsukasa to pay damages of 15 million yen. Id. This lawsuit seemed to open the floodgates. Id. Tsuksa 
was ordered to pay 4 million yen for a similar incident in Gifu; 42 million yen to a taxi firm in Hyogo, 
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the provision as retroactive, even applying it to acts that occurred prior to 
the 2007 revision.
110
 The liability provisions have become a key source of 
the public’s ability to check the power of large organized crime syndicates. 
Shortly after the enactment of the revisions, a popular story circulated 
about a Yakuza boss paying an underling’s unpaid McDonald’s bill [to 
avoid a civil lawsuit].
111
  
Since 2008, Yakuza membership has been steadily changing.
112
 
Between 1991 and 2000, 1,971 gangs disbanded; however, the total 
Yakuza population only decreased by 7,400 indicating that many of these 
groups simply reorganized.
113
 The Yamaguchi-gumi has dismissed, on 
average, 2,000 members a year.
114
 However, many analysts feel that these 
numbers misrepresent the success of the law and remain skeptical of 
reports of a shrinking Yakuza.
115
  
NPA data indicates that Yakuza gangs have reorganized their structure 
and attempted to improve their interactions with the public.
116
 While this 
may be attributed in part to the liability provisions of the 2007 revision, 
the data reveals a trend of decreasing “regular” Yakuza membership prior 
to the revisions, while the number of “associate” members has remained 
 
 
the Yamaguchi-gumi’s headquarters, that the gang had attempted to extort money from; as well as 
other legally ordered payments to individuals the gang has either assaulted or targeted for extortion. Id.  
 110. The court allowed the suit to proceed and Tsukasa eventually settled with the family of the 
victim, despite the fact that Tsukasa himself was in jail during the time of the murder and it had been 
undertaken by an affiliate group of the Yamaguchi-gumi. Adam Westlake, Yakuza Boss Pays $1.4 
Million in Compensation to Family of Murder Victim, THE JAPAN DAILY PRESS (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://japandailypress.com/yakuza-boss-pays-1-4-million-in-compensation-to-family-of-murder-victim-
0514668/. The Sumi-yoshi-kai, another one of Japan’s three major Yakuza gangs, has also been 
subjected to liability suits. In 2007, the Tokyo District Court ordered Sumiyoshi-kai executives to pay 
59 million yen to the family of an innocent South Korean student killed in a botched revenge shooting. 
Jun Hongo, Mob Leaders Found Liable for Botched Hit, THE JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 21, 2007), 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-168935033.html.  
 111. The crux of the story involves a Yamaguchi-guchi member who placed a drive-thru order in 
Kyoto. Adelstein, supra note 108. The Yakuza member complained that his meal got wet and after 
arguing with the manager sped off without paying. Id. Several days later Yamaguchi-gumi 
headquarters in Kobe received a bill via mail which the organization paid. Id. 
 112. At the end of 2010 the NPA reported that the number of full and associate Yakuza members 
was 78,600. National Police Agency, White Paper on Crime: 2011, 28 (2012) [hereinafter White Paper 
2011].  
 113. Hill, supra note 13, at 207.  
 114. Rankin Part 1, supra note 9. 
 115. When a Yakuza member is dismissed the gang sends a detailed report to the police and asks 
that the police treat the individual as a civilian. Id. However, neither the police nor the Yakuza have 
incentive to verify the report. Id. The police get to claim that the Yakuza is shirking on account of its 
enforcement measures and the Yakuza gain a shadow member who can act on behalf of the gang 
without incurring liability or being subjected to the measures of Botaiho. Id.  
 116. Id.  
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constant.
117
 Yakuza groups have also made a concerted effort to blend into 
society, making their affiliations known only when it is advantageous to 
do so.
118
 While a rise in the popularity of tattoos among civilians has 
helped the Yakuza blend in, groups have nearly eliminated some of the 
more conspicuous aspects of Yakuza culture in order to become less 
visible.
119
 To that end, in 2009 the Yamaguchi-gumi issued a new code of 
conduct to its members requesting that affiliated gangs refrain from using 
the Yamaguchi-gumi’s symbol, imprinting the crest on their business 
cards, or engaging in gang-like activity under the Yamaguchi-gumi 
name.
120
 Furthermore, there are strong statistical and anecdotal indications 
that the Anti-Boryokudan Law has led to a decrease in inter-gang 
conflicts. In the 1990s, the number of conflicts fell by over half.
121
 
Interviews with Yakuza members also indicate that inter-gang conflicts are 
resolved more expeditiously than before.
122
  
D. 2012 Revisions to the Anti-Boryokudan Law 
The 2012 revision to the Anti-Boryokudan law sought to cure the 
defects of the previous version of the Act by eliminating the need for 
cease-and-desist orders before the police can make an arrest.
123
 The 
revised Act allows the police to designate the gang’s territory as a “caution 
zone” and arrest individuals engaged in making unjustifiable demands 
 
 
 117. Regular members are the members as reported by Yakuza groups themselves. National Police 
Academy, White Paper on Crime 2010, 101 (2011) [hereinafter White Paper 2010]. “Associated 
Members are those who are not necessarily members of a Boryokudan, but have a relationship with a 
Boryokudan and attempt unlawful and violent actions with the power of the Boryokudan behind them 
or those who cooperate with and support the activities of Boryokudans by supplying funds, weapons, 
etc. or are associated with Boryokudans or Boryokudan members.” Id. In 2004, the yYakuza 
population consisted of 44,300 regular members and 43,000 associate members. Id. In 2009, the 
Yakuza population decreased to 38,600 regular members and 42,300 associate members. Id. In 2011, 
regular members fell further to 32,700 and associate members increased to 47,600. NPA: Number of 
Yakuza Members Drops Sharply in 2011, THE TOKYO REPORTER (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.tokyo 
reporter.com/2012/03/16/npa-number-of-yakuza-members-drops-sharply-in-2011/.  
 118. Rankin Part 1, supra note 9.  
 119. Head-shaving, fines, and expulsion have replaced ritual finger-cutting as the de facto forms 
of punishment in Yakuza culture today. Id.  
 120. Amy Takahashi, Yakuza Group Succumbs to Revised Law, Encourages ‘Code of Conduct’, 
THE TOKYO REPORTER (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.tokyoreporter.com/2009/09/17/yakuza-group-
succumbs-to-revised-law-encourages-code-of-conduct/.  
 121. Hill, supra note 13, at 208. 
 122. Police data corroborates the Yakuza member’s assertions. Id. Between 1983 and 1990, 75% 
of conflicts were resolved within a week; within the following ten years that number increased to 90%. 
Id.  
 123. Adam Westlake, Japan Passes Law that Allows Instant Arrest of Yakuza Members, THE 
JAPAN DAILY PRESS (July 31, 2012), http://japandailypress.com/japan-passes-law-that-allows-instant-
arrest-of-yakuza-members-317818/.  
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without prior warning.
124
 While the effectiveness of the Act is still largely 
dependent on civilian reporting, the modified enforcement measures 
provide a greater level of reassurance to individuals willing to report 
Yakuza activity.
125
  
It is unclear whether citizens feel these measures are necessary or offer 
the requisite protection. The impact on Yakuza activity also remains 
unclear. The consistent increase in cease-and-desist orders from 1995 to 
2004 is indicative of a public that is willing to take on the Yakuza, 
regardless of whether the police are able to arrest the Yakuza directly.
126
 
That said, there has been an increase in the number of reports issued 
according to National Police Agency statistics in 2010.
127
 The decrease 
could either be the result of decreased Yakuza activity or of waning public 
confidence in the effectiveness of the orders.
128
 While the impact of this 
legislation remains undetermined, recent arrests reinforce the revision’s 
relevance and potential utility in Japan.
129
 
E. Issues in Criminalization of Yakuza Membership 
While revisions to the Anti-Boryokudan Law have placed increased 
restrictions on Yakuza members, the law still requires the Yakuza member 
to commit a criminal act before they are subjects to the law’s provisions.130 
With continued Yakuza violence and turf wars twenty years after the 
implementation of the Anti-Boryokudan Law, it is reasonable to question 
the Japanese government’s failure to completely outlaw Yakuza 
membership. Both the United States and Italy, two countries that have 
 
 
 124. Swifter Punishment for Yakuza Expected after Anti-Gangster Law Passed, THE MAINICHI 
(July 26, 2012). 
 125. Westlake, supra note 123. A purely reactive police strategy is considered inappropriate when 
dealing with organized crime because a number of the victims will not report the crime, either because 
they are also operating within the criminal economy or because the crime between the parties was part 
of a consensual, illegal transaction. Hill, supra note 13, at 147.  
 126. In 1995, there were 1,321 discontinuance orders and 33 recurrence prevention orders issued. 
Shikata, supra note 7, at 419. Those numbers grew to 2,717 and 161 respectively by 2004. Id. 
 127. In 2010, 2,130 discontinuance orders and 85 recurrence prevention orders were issued; this 
represents a 31-order increase from the 2009 statistics. Crime in Japan in 2010, supra note 4, at 15 
(2011).  
 128. Between 2000 and 2010 the percentage of Yakuza members arrested for extortion decreased 
by 45.3%. White Paper 2010, supra note 117, at 103. However, in 2010, there were only 4 arrests and 
6 clearances for violations of the Anti-Boryokudan Law. Crime in Japan 2010, supra note 4, at 71. 
 129. Shortly after implementation of these measures, a Yamaguchi-gumi member was among four 
arrested for attempting to extort a restaurant owner. Yamaguchi-gumi Member Among 4 Arrested for 
Extortion of Yamagata Restaurant, THE TOKYO REPORTER, (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.tokyoreporter. 
com/2012/08/01/yamaguchi-gumi-member-among-4-arrested-for-extortion-of-yamagata-restaurant/.  
 130. 改正暴力団対策法成立. Revisions to the Anti-Boryokudan law, Law 53 of 2012.  
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faced organized crime epidemics, passed legislation banning organized 
criminal orgnaiztions and crime membership altogether.
131
 Examining the 
effects of these laws may provide answers as to whether Japan should take 
steps beyond the current revision, and, if they were to do so, what path 
they should take in enacting effective anti-Yakuza membership legislation.  
IV. RICO AND 416-BIS 
A. RICO: A Broad-Sweeping Measure 
In the United States, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) has become the primary legislative tool used 
against organized crime.
132
 RICO allows for the prosecution of any 
individual that participates in or conspires with a criminal organization 
through racketeering activity.
133
 Despite the effectiveness of RICO in 
combatting organized crime, the text of the statute contains no direct 
reference to organized crime.
134
  
Currently, the United States has no statutory definition of organized 
crime.
135
 Beginning in 1946, the Hobbs Act, prohibiting interference with 
or obstruction of interstate commerce, was the legislation most frequently 
invoked against organized crime.
136
 During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress 
established the Kefauver Committee,
137
 the McClellan Committee,
138
 and 
the Presidential Task Force on Organized Crime
139
 to investigate the 
growing organized crime problem and develop legislative 
countermeasures.
140
  
 
 
 131. The primary enforcement measure against criminal organization in the United States is the 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (2010). In 
1982, Italy enacted the Italian Penal Code Act 416-bis, which outlaws membership in or association 
with Mafia-type associations. Codice Penal [C.P.] art. 416-bis (Italy) (1982).  
 132. See HOWARD ABADINSKY, ORGANIZED CRIME 181–87 (7th ed. 2003).  
 133. Jerome P. Bjelopera & Kristin M. Finklea, Cong. Research Serv., R41547, Organized Crime: 
An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Law Enforcement, 6, 34–35 (2012).  
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (2010). 
 135. Bjelopera & Finklea, supra note 133, at 34. 
 136. Benjamin Scotti, Rico vs. 416-bis: A Comparison of U.S. and Italian Anti-Organized Crime 
Legislation, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 143, 147 (2000); Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 
(2010).  
 137. S. Res 202, 81st Cong. (1950). 
 138. S. Rept. 395, 85th Cong. (1957).  
 139. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, ORGANIZED CRIME AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/ocdetf.shtml.  
 140. The Kefauver Committee, established in 1951, examined how organized crime was 
structured and which laws it violated. Scotti, supra note 136, at 146–47. While the committee meetings 
created greater public awareness of organized crime, they did not result in significant legislative 
changes. Id. The McClellan Committee, during the Valachi hearings in 1963 and the Presidential Task 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss4/9
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In 1966, Senator John L. McClellan introduced a bill that would have 
criminalized Mafia membership.
141
 While the bill specifically referenced 
the Mafia, organizations that used any interstate commerce facility for the 
purpose of engaging in criminal activity were also targeted.
142
 The bill 
attacked the organizational structure of the Mafia by targeting individuals 
who not only committed criminal acts on behalf of the organization but 
also those who provided financial assistance or refused to cooperate with 
law enforcement.
143
 Though Congress rejected the proposal, the bill 
identified the need for legislation that extended beyond the low-level 
perpetrators of criminal acts to reach the bosses commanding their 
actions.
144
  
RICO was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 
to provide “new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault on 
organized crime and its economic roots.”145 Congress intended RICO to be 
used against organized crime groups that laundered profits gained through 
illegal activities in otherwise legal businesses.
146
 RICO prosecutions focus 
on the entire history of an organization’s illegal acts, allowing evidence of 
multiple acts committed to be introduced in a single trial.
147
 RICO extends 
additional criminal and civil consequences to specific state and federal 
 
 
Force on Organized Crime, gathered information and proposed legislation that would become the 
foundation of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, which included RICO. Id.  
 141. The proposed bill made designated Mafia membership, defined “Mafia” as a secret society 
whose members are pledged and dedicated to commit unlawful acts against the United States or any 
State thereof in furtherance of their objective to dominate organized crime and whose operations are 
conducted under a secret code of terror and reprisal not only for members who fail to abide by the 
edicts, decrees, decisions, principles, and instructions, a felony, and prescribed a 5-year minimum 
sentence. See S. 2187, 89th Cong. § 2-3 (1966).  
 142. Id.  
 143. § 2(b) prescribes that courts, when considering membership or participation, consider the 
individual’s (1) criminal convictions relating to the acts mentioned in § 2(a); (2) financial 
contributions to the organization; (3) loans or bail bonds given to other members of the organization; 
(4) any instructions given in relation to the organization to other individuals to commit crimes; 
(5) participation in meetings relating to criminal violations; or (6) refusal to cooperate with law 
enforcement. Id. § 2(b).  
 144. G. Robert Blakely & John Robert Blakely, Civil and Criminal RICO: An Overview of the 
Statute and its Operation, 64 DEF. COUNS. J., 36, 42 (1997); CYRILLE FIJNAUT & LETIZIA PAOLI, 
ORGANISED CRIME IN EUROPE: CONCEPTS, PATTERNS AND CONTROL POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND BEYOND 26 (2005). 
 145. Scotti, supra note 136, at 149 (quoting an analysis of the legislative intent behind RICO in 
Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983)); Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., 96-950, RICO: A 
Brief Sketch, 1 (2006).  
 146. Scotti, supra note 136, at 149.  
 147. Id. In United States v. Castellano, a RICO prosecution against a criminal organization, 
“twenty-four defendants were charged in a seventy-eight count indictment.” Lesley Suzanne Bonney, 
The Prosecution of Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 597 
(1993) (citing Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).  
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crimes.
148
 18 U.S.C § 1962, which targets individuals employed by, or 
associated with, offending organizations, is the substantive provision most 
frequently used to prosecute members of organized crime groups.
149
  
United States Supreme Court decisions have strengthened RICO by 
clarifying certain terms contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
150
 In Reves v. 
Ernst & Young, the Court concluded that “conduct or participate” requires 
participation in the “operation or management” of the enterprise.151 The 
“operation or management” test is broad enough to include all individuals 
associated with a criminal enterprise, allowing prosecutors to target 
members at every level of a criminal organization.
152
  
RICO prosecutions require that the government establish that an 
individual participated in a “pattern of racketeering activity.”153 
Racketeering acts encompass nearly every serious federal felony and most 
state felonies.
154
 The Supreme Court considered Congress’s intent in 
enacting RICO when it addressed the meaning of the term “pattern.”155 In 
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Court held that prosecutors in RICO 
cases must establish that the alleged criminal acts have both “continuity” 
and a “relationship” with one another.156 “Continuity” and “relationship” 
were further defined by the Supreme Court as describing criminal acts 
 
 
 148. Id. The list of federal and state crimes can be found in 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Congress regularly 
updates and adds offenses to this list. Id. at 1; 18 U.S.C § 1962 (2010). 
 149. Subsection (c) states, “It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct 
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C § 1962(c) (2010).  
 150. Scotti, supra note 136, at 150.  
 151. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). See also United States v. Swan, 250 F.3d 
495, 498 (7th Cir. 2001).  
 152. Scotti, supra note 136, at 151. The Court has reinforced their intention to extend liability 
beyond the upper management of an enterprise to individuals who exercise discretion in carrying out 
the instructions of upper management. See United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 92 (2d Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 753–54 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 
769–70 (3d Cir. 2005). [Would probably be more useful additional information if these cases had 
parenthetical descriptions]. 
 153. “(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through 
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of 
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2010). 
 154. Scotti, supra note 136, at 151. These acts include “any act or threat involving murder, 
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a 
controlled substance or listed chemical . . . which is chargeable under State law and punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2010).  
 155. The Supreme Court factored in Congress’s intention that Rico address the structure of 
criminal organizations and the problem as a whole rather than isolated acts. Scotti, supra note 136, at 
152 (citing Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479).  
 156. Id.  
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which “amounted to, or threatened the likelihood of, continued criminal 
activity” and relate to each other, respectively.157  
In the United States v. Turkette,
158
 Turkette and twelve other 
defendants involved in a drug trafficking organization argued that 
“enterprise” in RICO referred only to legitimate enterprises.159 The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the fact that the word “legitimate” 
did not precede “enterprise” in the statute indicated that the scope of RICO 
encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.
160
 Excluding 
illegitimate enterprises from RICO’s scope would preclude RICO from 
fulfilling its fundamental purpose of combating criminal organizations.
161
  
By broadly interpreting the statutory language, the Supreme Court has 
helped craft RICO into an effective weapon against organized crime in 
America.
162
 RICO prosecutions have been instrumental in eradicating 
domestic organized crime, as well as entire Mafia families, despite never 
explicitly mentioning “organized crime” or the “Mafia.”163  
B. Italian Legislation Outlawing Mafia Membership: 416-bis 
One of the first Italian laws to address the Mafia operated in a manner 
similar to the original Anti-Boryokudan Law. Act Number 1435 (Act 
1435), enacted in 1956, was a preventive measure that provided police 
officers with the power to warn individuals who were perceived as threats 
to public security and morals.
164
 If the individuals failed to comply with 
the warnings, they could be subjected to surveillance, house arrest, or 
internal exile without trial.
165
 Act 1453’s internal exile provision was 
counter-productive, as it ultimately contributed to Mafia expansion beyond 
Sicily, where the Mafia has its roots.
166
 Mafia members were displaced 
 
 
 157. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). Prosecutions subsequent 
to Northwestern Bell treated proof of the existence of a criminal organization as “a useful component 
in establishing a connection between two predicate acts.” Scotti, supra note 136, at 152.  
 158. 452 U.S. 576 (1980). 
 159. Id. at 579–80. Turkette was the first case in which a RICO prosecution was brought against a 
wholly illegal enterprise. Id.  
 160. The Court stated: “Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily 
have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, ‘legitimate.’ But it did nothing to 
indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose 
of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.” Id. at 581. 
 161. Scotti, supra note 136, at 153.  
 162. Bonney, supra note 147, at 597–99.  
 163. Scotti, supra note 136, at 153–54.  
 164. Id. at 157.  
 165. “Act 1453 provided only for administrative measures implemented by law enforcement and, 
as such, did not require the accused appear before a court.” Id.  
 166. Id.  
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into other areas of the country where they networked, made connections, 
and recruited new members in their new, government-assigned locales.
167
 
Act 1435’s measures concentrated on individuals and were therefore 
limited in their ability to combat large criminal organizations.
168
 
Article 416 was an early attempt by the Italian government to address 
organized crime by focusing on the structure of the criminal 
organization.
169
 Although Article 416 first took effect when the current 
Italian Penal Code was promulgated in 1931, the provisions of the article 
addressing criminal groups are derived from ancient Roman law.
170
 Article 
416 prohibits the creation of a group for the purpose of committing 
crimes.
171
 Article 416 applies to groups of at least three people in which 
the members join the organization voluntarily, agree to pursue shared 
criminal goals, and intend to engage in a continuous course of criminal 
conduct.
172
 
In 1982, the Italian Government enacted the La Torre-Rognoni Act, 
formally codified as 416-bis, in response to a high-profile Mafia 
assassination.
173
 Article 416-bis goes beyond Article 416 and specifically 
criminalizes “Mafia” membership.174 The legislature hoped that 416-bis 
would allow law enforcement to prosecute individuals who belong to the 
Mafia, and whom the Mafia’s organizational hierarchy had insulated from 
liability under earlier legislation.
175
 Article 416-bis defines the Mafia as an 
association that is used by members to commit crimes and exert influence 
 
 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 158. 
 170. During the Roman Republic and Empire, Roman law punished certain criminal groups 
considered to be a danger to the state. Alexander D. Tripp, Comment, Margins of the Mob: A 
Comparison of Reves v. Ernst & Young with Criminal Association Laws in Italy and France, 20 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 263, 297 n.300 (1996).  
 171. C.P Art. 416 (It.) (1982), available at http://www.camera.it/_bicamerali/leg15/commbicanti 
mafia/files/pdf/Art_416bis.pdf. “When three or more people associate for the purpose of committing a 
number of crimes, those that promote, form or organize the association are punished, for this alone, by 
imprisonment for from three to ten years. For simply participating in the association, the punishment is 
imprisonment for from one to five years.” Tripp, supra note 170, at 297 n.299 (translation of C.P. art. 
416 (It.) by author of Tripp).  
 172. If the members agree only to conduct a fixed number of crimes, they are guilty as 
accomplices, not as members of a criminal association. Id. at 301. 
 173. In 1982 the Mafia assassinated Prefect Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa. Scotti, supra note 136, at 
159. The La Torre-Rognoni Act was passed ten days later. Id.  
 174. Article 416-bis specifically targets the Mafia: “Whoever belongs to a Mafia association 
comprised of three or more people, is punished by imprisonment for three to six years.” Tripp, supra 
note 170, at 301 n.328 (translation of C.P. art. 416-bis (It.) by author of Tripp).  
 175. Id. at 302.  
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over economic or administrative activity.
176
 Under Article 416-bis, 
prosecutors no longer need to point to specific criminal acts; instead, they 
simply need to prove an association with the Mafia.
177
 Witnesses are also 
unnecessary, as the prosecution is based on documentation of the 
economic and financial operations carried out by Mafia members.
178
  
Initially, implementation of 416-bis was problematic because the 
legislature failed to define the terms “membership,” “belonging,” and 
“criminal group.”179 The absence of clear definitions created a blurred 
boundary between Mafia members and innocent individuals.
180
 For 
example, in June 1983, law enforcement arrested and indicted over a 
thousand individuals under 416-bis, many of whom were innocent.
181
 
Furthermore, since 416-bis did not require the use of witnesses to establish 
a connection to the Mafia, prosecutions relied heavily on written materials 
such as address books, letters written by “certified” Mafia members, 
attendance records, or Mafia trials and prison money order receipts.
182
 
Since many Italians share the same surnames, cases of mistaken identity 
were common.
183
  
416-bis’s implementation was also hampered by the requirement under 
Italian law that preliminary trials be held within two months of 
indictment.
184
 In mass-roundups, judges were forced to make rushed 
determinations based on hasty summaries of the evidence.
185
 Likewise, 
while 416-bis proved capable of allowing the police to arrest an entire 
criminal organization from foot soldiers to leadership, the expansive 
 
 
 176. “An association is a Mafia association when those that belong to it use the power of 
intimidation of the associative bond, and the power of oppression, and the code of silence that comes 
from the bond in order to commit crimes, to acquire by direct or indirect means the management or at 
least the control over economic activity, permits, authorizations, bids, and public contracts or to gain 
unjust favors or profits for oneself or others.” Id. at 301 n.328 (translation of C.P. art. 416-bis (It.) by 
author of Tripp).  
 177. Prosecutors are not required to prove the existence of an organized criminal structure. 
“[I]nvestigators only have to prove a connection between the Mafia’s method of procuring profits, and 
the types of illegal activities in which its members engage.” Scotti, supra note 136, at 160.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 160–61.  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. at 161. On June 17, 1983, police arrested 856 people. 1,013 would later be indicted. 
MARCO JACQUEMET, CREDIBILITY IN COURT: COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES IN THE CAMORRA TRIALS 
48 (1996).  
 182. Scotti, supra note 136, at 161. “Certified” merely refers to individuals previously convicted 
of the crime of association. Id. at 161 n.155. 
 183. Id. at 161–62.  
 184. JACQUEMET, supra note 181, at 52.  
 185. In the June 17, 1983 roundup, the interrogation time for each defendant was twenty minutes, 
during which the judges had to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to commence a trial. 
Id.  
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provisions of the legislation made it difficult for the judiciary to balance 
their goal of enforcing the law while providing fair process to every 
accused individual.
186
 Eventually, the Justice Department recognized that 
416-bis prosecutions relied too heavily on circumstantial evidence and that 
the line between members and unaffiliated individuals needed to be 
clarified.
187
 This led to an increased use of pentiti (collaborators from 
criminal organizations) as expert witnesses in 416-bis prosecutions.
188
  
The Mafia’s continued influence in Italian society is evidence that 416-
bis has had limited effectiveness.
189
 As long as the Mafia exerts control 
over the police force and the judiciary, and political figures continue to 
demonstrate willingness to tolerate Mafia presence, it is unlikely that Italy 
will make the legislative changes necessary to eradicate the Mafia.
190
  
V. CONCLUSION: THE WEAKNESSES OF THE DELICATE APPROACH 
Drafters of the Anti-Boryokudan law drew inspiration from RICO, 
rather than its Italian counterparts, due to concerns that implementing the 
European method of criminalizing organized crime membership would 
infringe on freedom of association.
191
 The Anti-Boryokudan law does not 
mimic RICO, but instead operates as a middle ground between RICO and 
European provisions such as 416-bis. 416-bis criminalizes Mafia 
membership; RICO criminalizes participation in an organization involved 
in a pattern of racketeering.
192
 In contrast, the Anti-Boryokudan Law 
subjects members of criminal organizations to higher standards when 
committing criminal acts. The effectiveness of RICO and the 
complications associated with 416-bis demonstrate an instructive blueprint 
 
 
 186. Benjamin Scotti, Rico vs. 416-bis: a Comparison of U.S. and Italian Anti-Organized Crime 
Legislation, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 143, 162 (2000); The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 
(2010). 
 187. Scotti, supra note 136, at 162.  
 188. JACQUEMET, supra note 181, at 53.  
 189. In January 2012 over 200,000 businesses were tied to Mafia lenders in Italy. James 
Mackenzie, Mafia Now “Italy’s No.1 Bank” as Crisis Bites: Report, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/10/us-italy-mafia-idUSTRE8091YX20120110.  
 190. Scotti, supra note 136, at 164. 
 191. According to Hill: 
The debate within Japan was thus conducted with reference to European and American 
models. The European approach, caricatured as criminalisation of organised crime group 
membership, was thought to violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and 
deemed inappropriate. Most attention was therefore directed at America’s Racketeer Inspired 
and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO).  
Hill, supra note 42, at 14.  
 192. See supra Part III, Part IV. 
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for legislation that operatively eradicates organized crime.
193
 In order to 
eliminate the Yakuza, Japanese legislatures can no longer sit on the fence. 
They must enact wide-reaching legislation similar to RICO that allows 
local police departments to subject Yakuza members to the highest levels 
of criminal-liability. The current legislation places too much of the onus 
upon Japanese citizens to either bravely challenge the Yakuza in civil 
court, or shame those associated with the Yakuza through public opinion. 
It remains unclear why the Diet has avoided enacting RICO-type 
legislation; however, the policies of the current regime invite speculation 
that the Diet does not want the Yakuza to go away.  
There are a number of possible explanations for the Diet’s failure to 
enact RICO-like legislation. Yakuza political connections or influence 
could be the cause, but the growing trends in legislation and public 
opinion suggest otherwise.
194
 There is credence to the claim that the 
Yakuza and the police have a symbiotic relationship. A pervasive Yakuza 
threat creates the need for companies to hire Yakuza experts; coincidently, 
these positions are often filled by retired police officers.
195
  
While a Yakuza world dominated by three large gangs causes violence, 
the politicians may feel that it also offers stability and easily identifiable 
instruments of control. A destabilized Yakuza realm could result in 
widespread violence and chaos that the police would be unable to control 
effectively.  
The Japanese government might also be factoring in the perceived 
social function of the Yakuza. Not only have the Yakuza acted as a 
 
 
 193. From 1972 to 1997, RICO prosecutions in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, 
Detroit, Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, and New Orleans took out La Cosa Nostra, the principle 
organized crime group in the United States at the time. Alexandra Marks, The Untouchables No More: 
Mafia Loses Influence in US, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 23, 1997), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
1997/0623/062397.us.us.5.html/(page)/2. In contrast, the Italian Government’s over-reaching 416-bis, 
which resulted in a public relations nightmare and the tendency of the government to reach tacit 
agreements, has exacerbated the problem of organized crime in Italy. Scotti, supra note 136, at 163.  
 194. The public no longer tolerates politicians with Yakuza ties. UPDATE: Justice Minister Quits 
After ‘Mob Ties’ Scandal, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Oct. 23, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/ 
behind_news/politics/AJ201210230019. The business community is also aggressively pursuing 
measures to keep the Yakuza out of large Japanese businesses. Gangster Register Aims to Bar Yakuza 
from Japan’s Stock Market, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Jan. 4, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/ 
business/AJ201301040053.  
 195. According to Hill: 
Although it is not specified in the law how these organisations should be constituted, the 
prefectural centres are closely wedded to their respective police forces. Offices are generally 
situated within the local police headquarters and many of their employees are retired police 
officers. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in part, these centres were designed to create 
amakudari positions for police officers.  
Hill, supra note 42, at 16.  
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conduit for dispute resolution between citizens, they offer a career path 
and social safety net to disenfranchised groups in Japanese society. With 
Japan’s economy still affected after a twenty-year slump ending only 
about a decade ago, the government may consider the Yakuza a pragmatic 
or necessary alternative to unemployment benefits or other forms of 
government assistance.
196
  
Because the ruling political parties have been unwilling to take on the 
Yakuza directly, it has placed most of the onus of combating the Yakuza 
on the public. The Anti-Boryokudan Law does, however, provide for the 
establishment of prefectural Elimination of Boryokudan Centers.
197
 These 
centers are tasked with assisting Yakuza victims, conducting press 
campaigns, and helping members who wish to leave the gangs.
198
 While 
these measures may appear insignificant in the grand scheme of large 
crime syndicates, the centers’ high-profile campaigns have been 
championed as a major success of the legislation.
199
 The Anti-Boryokudan 
Law also allows for those prefectural offices to file lawsuits requesting 
removal of local Yakuza offices.
200
 The National Police Agency reported 
in 2011 that a number of prefectures had initiated such lawsuits.
201
  
In addition to providing the public with greater power to combat the 
Yakuza, the Diet has also placed a greater burden on citizens to refrain 
from engaging in business interactions with Yakuza groups. The 
 
 
 196. See generally Steve Lohr, From Japan’s Slump in 1990s, Lessons for U.S., THE N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/business/worldbusiness/09japan.html?page wanted= 
all&_r=0.  
 197. Botaiho, Law No. 115 of 2006 and Law No. 53 of 2012, art. 32. 
 198. White Paper 2011, supra note 112, at 21-2.  
 199. The Tokyo police chief made a number of public appearances before the enactment of the 
2012 revision. Tokyo Police Chief Promotes Anti-Gang Legislation at J-League Match, THE TOKYO 
REPORTER (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.tokyoreporter.com/2012/08/09/tokyo-police-chief-promotes-
anti-gang-legislation-at-j-league-match/. As part of his campaign, the head of the J-league, Japan’s 
professional soccer league, banned players in the league from associating with yYakuza members. Id. 
The Fukoka Prefecture ran a well-publicized cash-for-weapons campaign, urging citizens to turn in 
any hand grenades in exchange for a reward. Jake Adelstein & Nathalie Kyoko-Stucky, Handouts for 
Hand Grenades: Yakuza Gang War Leads to an Explosive Bounty, THE WIRE (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.thewire.com/global/2012/04/handouts-hand-grenades-Yakuza-gang-war-leads-explosive-
bounty/50624/; see also White Paper 2011, supra note 112, at 21.  
 200. New Yakuza Measure Tightens the Screw on Crime Groups, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Jan. 24, 
2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201201240001. The revised law also 
allows the police to prohibit the Yakuza gang from using their office in the event of violent action in 
the area. Law to Boost Cops’ Power to Ban Gangs from Offices, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Oct. 15, 
2011), http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Crime/Story/A1Story20111015-305116.html. 
Under the previous version of the act, the police could only prohibit office usage when the gang was 
involved in gang warfare. Id. This expands the scope of the law to cover any violent act by the gang. 
Id.  
 201. White Paper 2011, supra note 112, at 21-2. 
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Organized Crime Exclusion Laws enacted in 2011 place increased 
responsibility on civilians to lead the battle against Yakuza by prohibiting 
them from making payments to Yakuza members.
202
 The laws were 
devised by the national government, but the individual prefectures each 
passed laws closely resembling the model version.
203
 Generally, the laws 
target a range of activity, from payments of protection money by private 
companies to issuing loans to Yakuza members by banks.
204
  
These laws initially seem vexing. At the time of their inception, if a 
Yakuza member threatened an individual, the individual was a victim, but 
the police were unable to arrest the Yakuza member unless he persisted in 
his threat.
205
 If the individual succumbed to the Yakuza member’s threat 
and paid the Yakuza, then that individual became an offender under the 
prefecture’s Organized Crime Exclusion Law.206 
Analysts note that the penalties for violating these laws are not 
severe.
207
 However, violating the law allows the police to enter and search 
the property of an individual or company they suspect is not in compliance 
with the ordinance without a warrant.
208
 The objective was to make it more 
expensive—both in terms of money and reputation—to comply with 
Yakuza demands than to report them.
209
 The exclusion ordinances also 
promote the use of Boryokudan-exclusion clauses in business contracts.
210
 
 
 
 202. Battling the Yakuza, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/ 
101east/2012/08/201281355545671696.html.  
 203. Jake Adelstein, Goodbye to the Yakuza, THE WIRE (Oct. 1 2011), http://www.thewire.com/ 
global/2011/10/goodbye-Yakuza/43206/.  
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.  
 207. The general punishments are a maximum fine of around ¥500,000 ($5,000) or, in severe 
cases, a maximum one-year prison sentence. Rankin Part 2, supra note 15.  
 208. Id.  
 209. A retired police officer explained,  
The new laws will make the price of paying off the Yakuza, in loss of face and in penalties, 
much more expensive than the actual cash payments to the Yakuza. It highly incentives firms 
not to cooperate or collude with organized crime, much as the revisions to the commerce law 
in December 1997, made it unacceptable for large listed companies to pay off sokaiya (総会屋), 
a/k/a racketeers. After a few major company executives were arrested along with the bad guys 
for riekikyo (利益供与) the pay-offs drastically declined, as did the number of sokaiya.  
Adelstein, supra note 203.  
 210. While the ordinances vary by prefecture, Adelstein references Tokyo Prefecture’s ordinance 
which requires “all companies operating within Tokyo to follow the ordinance by inserting organized 
crime exclusionary clauses into their contracts, and making an effort not to do business with the 
yYakuza and/or other anti-social forces.” Id. This particular ordinance did include an exemption for 
companies that had already been working with Yakuza groups allowing them to avoid punishment if 
they reported their relationship to the police. Id The police would then assist the company in severing 
the relationship with the Yakuza group. Id.  
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The National Government has also included these clauses in all public 
works contracts since 2009.
211
 While some heralded this provision as the 
beginning of the end of the modern Yakuza, others viewed the ordinances 
as prescribing too much power to the police.
212
 
In light of these exclusion ordinances, the 2012 revisions to the Anti-
Boryokudan Act appear not to be the imposition of stricter restrictions on 
the Yakuza but instead a necessary counterbalance to duties imposed on 
ordinary citizens. Before the exclusion ordinances, if an individual felt that 
the protection order or injunction would be inadequate, an individual 
threatened by the Yakuza could choose to pay the Yakuza demand and not 
file a police report.
213
 The exclusion laws make this payment illegal, 
leaving the individual with the choice to report the crime and receive little 
protection, on the one hand, or, alternatively, break the law.
214
 The 2012 
revisions to the Anti-Boryokudan Law address this by providing 
threatened individuals with the possibility of a greater of level protection 
and encouraging them to report the extortion attempt rather be caught in a 
bind between violating the Exclusion Law or facing Yakuza violence.
215
 
However, providing this modicum of increased protection to 
individuals and relying on community action will not eliminate the 
Yakuza from Japan. RICO and 416-bis demonstrate that legislation 
specifically crafted to attack the organizational hierarchy of gangs is the 
most effective method of eradicating organized crime. 
 
 
 211. White Paper 2010, supra note 108, at 106. This provision has received a great deal of press 
and praise in Japan. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Pushing the Mob Out of Businesses, NY TIMES (Nov. 18, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/business/global/19yakuza.html?pagewanted=all. The 
government vigorously promoted their ban of using contractors and labor with Yakuza ties in 
constructing the Tokyo Sky Tree. Id. The exclusion policy has also extended to the cleanup and 
rebuilding effort following the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. A senior Sumiyoshi-kai boss was 
arrested for dispatching workers to the reconstruction project at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
plant in violation of labor dispatch laws. Jake Adelstein, First Arrest Made Linking Yakuza with 
Fukushima Nuclear Clean-Up Crews, THE WIRE (May 22, 2012), http://www.thewire.com/global/ 
2012/05/first-arrest-made-linking-yakuza-fukushima-nuclear-clean-crews/52649/.  
 212. Rankin notes the case of a printing firm in Fukuoka, which was warned for printing business 
cards for a Yakuza boss. Rankin Part 1, supra note 9. He theorizes that the situation may play out such 
that, in order to prevent future police harassment of his business, he will have to ingratiate himself 
with the local police department through gift-giving and deference. Id. 
 213. Jake Adelstein, Goodbye to the Yakuza, THE WIRE (Oct. 1 2011), http://www.thewire.com/ 
global/2011/10/goodbye-Yakuza/43206/.[will become will become Adelstein, supra note 188 when 
added into endnotes] 
 214. Colin P.A. Jones, Tokyo ordinance a potential contract-killer, THE JAPAN TIMES, (Nov. 15, 
2011). 
 215. Botaiho, Law No. 115 of 2006 and Law No. 53 of 2012. 
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So far, the Anti-Boryokudan Law’s primary effect has been to organize 
the public consciousness against the Yakuza.
216
 Politicians must take 
advantage of this favorable environment and provide prosecutors with the 
tools necessary to pursue criminal organizations in large-scale, efficient 
prosecutions with stiff penalties for perpetrators. Because the Anti-
Boryokudan Law lacks these measures, the Yakuza will remain an 
influential part of Japanese society.  
Edward F. Reilly Jr.
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 216. Yakuza complain of fewer requests for their services because the public now perceives using 
the Yakuza to mediate disputes as wrong. Additionally, owners of bars and restaurants have in some 
cases also refused Yakuza advances to purchase overpriced goods or pay protection money. 
WOLFGANG HERBERT, GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 156–57 
(Jeremy Seymour Eades, Tom Gill, Harumi Befu eds., 2000). Public perception has also shifted in 
relation to celebrities with Yakuza connections. In 2011, Japan’s most popular talk-show host retired 
abruptly after his connection with a Yakuza boss was revealed. Justin McCurry, Japanese TV Host 
Shinsuke Shimada Resigns Over Yakuza Links, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2011/aug/25/shinsuke-shimada-resigns-Yakuza-links. More recently, a Yakuza 
boss was arrested for hiding his own affiliation while playing on a golf course that prohibits Yakuza 
membership. Gang Boss Arrested for Masquerading as Ordinary Citizen, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Dec. 
1, 2012), https://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201212010011.  
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